This document is meant to describe our thinking about the kinds of circumstances under which staff might look at, or distribute, private information about our users. Rather then describe a rigid set of rules, it is a fairly exhaustive list of the situations under which staff does use root access to look at user's data. From time to time new situations come up that the staff hasn't ever had to think about before. Such situations are handled in a manner generally consistent with the examples listed here.
These situations always require judgment. There are some things that are clearly OK, and some things that are clearly not, but there are wide gray areas, where a staff member must use judgment. Often there is not time for staff members to discuss the situation, and whichever staff member is on the spot must make a judgment call.
Grex's situation is in some ways unique:
In all cases, staff first tries to authenticate the person using public information (.plan files, .forward files, web pages, etc) or information explicitly given to staff (the newuser log files). They don't go further unless the user expresses some urgent desire to get back on the account (usually to access email sent there). Then, if the staff member feels inclined to believe that the user is who he claim and if that user requests it, a staff member may check to see if non-publicly readable files have the contents the user says they have, or if there are other clues to the owner's identity on the account.
When a staff member does this, it is important to keep the search as narrow as possible, and not to repeat or reproduce any information found, no matter how trivial, particularly not to the presumed "owner" of the account.
This is one of the clearest of the OK situations, but some caution is still required. The staff member should get explicit permission from the user, and should make clear to the user what kinds of stuff the staff member is likely to be looking at in the course of making repairs. The staff member should be reasonably confident that this is the real owner of the account, should try to look only at what needs to be looked at, and should not repeat or reproduce anything seen.
NOTE: By "causing problems" we mean technical problems, not social problems. No degree of rudeness and unpleasantness would justify any staff investigation of a user's private files or mail. Only actions that appear to undermine system security or performance may do so.
In many cases it is unclear if the user is causing problems deliberately or accidentally. If the user is running a program that slows down the system, for example, a staff member may have to look at the program to try to determine if it could be the cause of a problem, and if it is deliberately so or accidentally so. When staff looks at such a program, the goal should be exclusively to determine its intent and its impact on Grex. Copies should not be "borrowed" (exception: Grex staffers sometimes collect copies of programs designed to crash or crack the system for use in testing our system security), and detailed information about the program should not be repeated to anyone except other staffers.
In cases where the problem appears accidental, staff generally tries to contact the user and advise him on how to avoid the problem in the future. Details of what staff may have seen are not repeated to anyone except other staffers.
In cases where the problem appears deliberate, staff may look more broadly through the user's files to try to get a complete picture of what he may have been doing. Quite often relevant information is compiled and passed on to administrators of the sites the user uses to connect to Grex, and to other sites that may have been compromised by the user. Copies are likely to go to national organizations like CERT that track security problems. Grex staff may leave such accounts active, and may do more than the usual amount of monitoring of the activities of such users. However, even in these situations, staff will try to keep information unconnected with the problem private.
Among the most common complaints are those about users sending email that bothers someone. Staff will readily help people figure out if the email really came from Grex, and will give out information about Grex accounts that is publicly accessible to any Grexer (NOTE: this includes records of from where that user connects to Grex). Staff will not look into any private information in response to such complaints.
Complaints of Grex users attempting to crack other systems may trigger a more thorough investigation of their accounts on Grex, along the lines described in the previous section.
In this kinds of situations, staff members should make an effort to find ways of dealing with system problems that do not require actually looking at private information, and they should not divulge any information they might run across.
This kind of research should be done only when it serves some direct end. It shouldn't be just to satisfy idle curiosity.
Grex's staff will not normally try to act on their own judgments on issues like libel and slander. People with problems of that sort should work through the proper legal authorities, and Grex's staff will cooperate with those authorities.
Though generally the Grex staff tries to keep anything they see when looking at private files secret, a staff member might someday see something that he or she feels must be reported to the authorities. This would be a difficult decision depending very much on the particulars of the case. Grex has no fixed policy on how such cases should be dealt with.
When staff does have to look at private information, the basic principle is to look as narrowly as possible. For example, instead of looking at a person's entire mail file, one would use a program to extract and display only the information being sought.
Remember, it is always possible for new situations to come up, and it is always possible for staff members to make mistakes. However scrupulous the staff tries to be, users are advised to protect their privacy by not storing or sending extremely sensitive private information through Grex (or any other computer that you personally don't completely control).